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The Folly of Risk Assessment, part deux

It’s not just me. Really, it’s not. An article in the October 2010 issue of Australasian Psychiatry By Christopher Ryan, Olav Nielssen, Michael Paton, and Matthew Large has put very nicely the case against risk assessment. The authors use an analogy with the insurance industry (where the practice of risk assessment originated) to illustrate the problems with risk assessment in psychiatry, and I think it’s an excellent article.

Really it boils down, for me, to individuals versus groups. I discussed this in my very first Midweek Medicine post, drawing an analogy with road traffic fatalities: we can identify very clearly people who fit into higher-risk groups for crashing on the road, but we simply cannot identify which individuals from those groups will be the ones who crash and die.

Their insurance analogy is related but somewhat more comprehensive:

“Insurance policies share risk among policy holders. Each policy holder pays a small defined cost, in the form of a premium, in return for a larger compensatory payout in the event of an adverse event. Insurance companies manage the sharing of risk by setting different premiums for different categories of policy holder. These categories are determined according to the calculated probability of the adverse events occurring and the magnitude of potential loss.

“In conducting their business however, insurers make simple, reliable estimations of the probable total number of crashes or thefts within each group sharing the same risk. They do not attempt to predict and identify which individual policy-holder will make a claim, and insurance is not a way of reducing car accidents or thefts.

(emphasis mine)

The second point there is the same as mine: that we can make predictions about populations and groups much much better than we can about individuals. When a clinician “does a risk assessment” we do not predict the likelihood that patient will cause or come to harm. In fact we are simply assigning them to categories (low, medium, or high risk). No matter how much we “might feel, intuitively,” that we are predicting something, we are most assuredly not.

Still, what’s the harm, right? Better than nothing, right? Well … no. The bit that this insurance analogy adds to mine of road traffic crashes/fatalities is that of individuals paying a premium, which in psychiatry, is:

“…the personal and financial cost of additional treatment experienced by the patient, including coercive treatment imposed on ‘high-risk’ patients, whether or not they will actually cause or experience harm.”

(again, emphasis is mine)

To illustrate their points the authors chose to look at the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, and the risk assessment tool derived therefrom. They noted that there are numerous actuarial tools – which have been shown to be better than clinical assessment – for both violence and suicide. They chose this particular one as it is “supported by a substantial body of research and is perhaps the most proven risk assessment instrument devised for use in general psychiatric settings.” They examined the data supporting this tool:

157 patients – 55 categorised as high risk and 102 as low risk.
Observed for 20 weeks, during which 27 committed an act of violence.
71% classified correctly as being high or low risk.
Area under the “receiver operator curve” was 63%, which they say translates to “a 63% chance that a randomly picked patient who went on to commit an act of violence would have a higher score than a randomly picked patient who did not…”
The instrument had a sensitivity of 67.8% and specificity of 72.1%
Of the 157 patients there were 19 true-positive categorisations, 36 false positives, 9 false-negatives, and 93 true-negatives.

The authors of this paper go on to discuss in turn the effects of true-positives, false-positives, false-negatives, and true-negatives:

The first group (true-positives; those who were identified as being high-risk, and did go on to commit a violent act) pay a higher “premium” but do potentially gain in terms of more assertive treatment and additional input, which could potentially improve the course of their illness and reduce (not eliminate) the likelihood of adverse events.

The second group (false-positives) are those who have been assessed as at high-risk of violence, but do not go on to commit any violent act. They pay the same high premium as the former, but with no benefit in terms of avoiding harm. Possibly it could be argued they benefit in terms of more assertive treatment, but (1) this has to be weighed up against the more restrictive and coercive care, possibly higher doses of medication than they need, and (2) it can also be argued that directing extra resources to this group deprives patients who are clinically similar but not categorised as “high-risk”.

The third group, false negatives, are those who were categorised as low risk but did go on to commit some violence. They pay a low premium, but missed out thereby on treatments which might have improved their conditions and/or prevented an adverse event (possibly)

The fourth group is the true-negatives: those who were categorised as low-risk and did nothing violent. They pay a low premium and get no benefit.

Already it appears to me to be pretty clear that there’s definite potential harm from risk assessment, for little to no gain. To ram the point home further, the authors plug in some numbers (the 1 in 10,000 annual incidence of homicide by patients with treated schizophrenia) to the sensitivity and specificity values for the MacArthur tool. Basically the result is:

“In other words, 4117 patients would have to be detained or otherwise managed in a homicide-proof fashion for a year to try to prevent just one of those patients committing a homicide, and yet one in every 22,421 patients assessed to be ‘low-risk’ would commit a homicide in that period.”

An NNT of 4117 is pretty piss-poor, frankly. Especially when the treatment at issue is restrictive and coercive, and carries its own risks.

We have to stop doing this. Politicians and health departments have to stop mandating it, but we as a profession have to state clearly that it doesn’t work, it’s wasting scarce resources and is completely unjust, and it has the potential to cause harm by overtreating some and missing danger in others. As a profession we all have to realise this, and then help politicians and wider society to realise it.

Damn Fool Mental Health Motion

So, what’s got my knickers in a knot? You might well ask … And I might well answer: Prof. McGorry appears* to lend his support to the Opposition’s damn fool “Mental Health Motion” for increased funding for mental health services nationwide. Hang on (you might say); isn’t that a good thing? (you might ask). No (I will say). From GetUp’s website:

“The Opposition’s motion proposes to fund 90 ‘Headspace’ centres and 20 ‘EPPIC’ centres across Australia.

Both are proven models of community-based mental health care for young Australians. Headspace centres are drop-in community services where young Australians can find help without going through a hospital system. EPPICs – Early Psychosis Prevention and Intervention Centres – are similar community based facilities but for those with advanced conditions.”

What these are, in fact, are boutique organisations which provide (no doubt high quality) care to a vanishingly small proportion of the psychiatrically ill population. Headspace is available from ages 12-25 but has no ability to care for people withserious psychiatric illness, such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and serious depressive disorders. This is what the motion refers to as “those with advanced conditions”; they get cared for by EPPIC … if they’re psychotic, yes. That’s what one of the Ps stands for. True, bipolar disorder can get in to services like these, but non-psychotic depression? Hells no. That’s not epic enough for EPPIC.

And I mentioned the age range for Headspace; what about EPPIC? I don’t know exactly, but I do know it’s a youth service, which generally have an upper limit of 24.

So, if you have a serious illness, no Headspace. If you don’t have a psychotic illness, no EPPIC. If you’re not callow youth, no EPPIC. You just get me. ;)

Oh, and one more – really important – thing: these boutique outfits are not set up to do acute or intensive interventions, so if you need intensive treatment (in hospital or at home) and/or there’s a sniff of danger to yourself or someone else, they will pass you on like a hot potato to the general acute psychiatry service.

Which no-one is jumping up and down making high profile motions to increase funding for.

While these boutique side projects are polished up with their glossy brochures, shiny new buildings and lovely research opportunities, the core psychiatric services languish in under-resourced chaos. This is despite us being the services which treat the most severely ill patients, the people most in need. Thus we get the bizarre situation where the less unwell you are, the better resourced the service you get.

Please to explain.

*I realise that Prof. McGorry might have done no more than provide requested costings for EPPIC, but it does appear as though he is supporting this hare-brained motion. No surprise, since EPPIC is his baby, and he’s done very well out of it.

Opposition and Defiance: a Disorder?

Yesterday Monicks posted a post to her blog at Monicks.net ;) This post was about the diagnosis of oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and followed on from another blog post positing that this diagnostic category was potentially dangerous, as it could include free thinkers. The author of that post tried to draw a comparison with the former Soviet Union, and the diagnosis (not explicitly named in the post) of “sluggish schizophrenia”, the primary manifestation of which was said to be disagreement with the State. That was a terrible state of affairs and a dark chapter in psychiatry’s history, but the comparison draws a very long bow.

I will say, before embarking on what might be at least a partial defence of the category (but probably won’t be), that it is one of “our” diagnoses that causes me some concern – as a psychiatrist and also as a parent.

ODD is included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association as one of the disorders usually first apparent in childhood/adolescence. It refers to “a recurrent pattern of negativistic, defiant, disobedient, and hostile behaviour toward authority figures that persists for at least 6 months…”. I can see why people would be concerned about the sound of that. A key word for me in that sentence though is “negatavistic”. This doesn’t simply mean being argumentative; negativism is an automatic refusal/defiance/doing the opposite. It’s not about rational disagreement. That’s the essential thing.

That’s “Criterion A”, which is broken down into various behaviours, at least four of which must be manifest for a diagnosis of ODD:

losing temper (Criterion A1), arguing with adults (Criterion A2), actively defying or refusing to comply with the requests or rules of adults (Criterion A3), deliberately doing things that will annoy other people (Criterion A4), blaming others for his or her own mistakes or misbehavior (Criterion A5), being touchy or easily annoyed by others (Criterion A6), being angry and resentful (Criterion A7), or being spiteful or vindictive (Criterion A8)

Crieterion B says that it must be more frequent than you would normally see given the child’s age and developmental stage; it’s quite appropriate for a two year old to respond to just about anything with “no!” If a 10 year old does so (unless they’re being told stupid stuff all the time) there might be a problem of some sort. If a 15 year old does it it’s probably normal again ;) – as well as specifying that it must cause “significant impairment in social, academic, or occupational function”. Then Criteria C and D exclude symptoms of mood or psychotic disorders, and conduct disorder or antisocial personality disorder.

So, that’s what DSM -IV says. What about DSM 5?

A. A persistent pattern of angry and irritable mood along with defiant and vindictive behavior as evidenced by four (or more) of the following symptoms being displayed with one or more persons other than siblings.

Angry/Irritable Mood

1. Loses temper

2. Is touchy or easily annoyed by others.

3. Is angry and resentful

Defiant/Headstrong Behavior

4. Argues with adults

5. Actively defies or refuses to comply with adults’ request or rules

6. Deliberately annoys people

7. Blames others for his or her mistakes or misbehavior

Vindictiveness

8. Has been spiteful or vindictive at least twice within the past six months

B. (NOTE: UNDER CONSIDERATION) The persistence and frequency of these behaviors should be used to distinguish a behavior that is within normal limits from a behavior that is symptomatic to determine if they should be considered a symptom of the disorder. For children under 5 years of age, the behavior must occur on most days for a period of at least six months unless otherwise noted (see symptom #8). For individuals 5 years or older, the behavior must occur at least once per week for at least six months, unless otherwise noted (see symptom #8). While these frequency criteria provide a minimal level of frequency to define symptoms, other factors should also be considered such as whether the frequency and intensity of the behaviors are non-normative given the person’s developmental level, gender, and culture.

C. The disturbance in behavior causes clinically significant impairment in social, educational, or vocational activities.

D. The behaviors may be confined to only one setting or in more severe cases present in multiple settings.

So what do I think?

Honestly – it’s hard to see this as other than very value-laden, and drenched in a desire for “niceness”. I’ve written before about the psychopathologising of normal life, and this does seem to me to be an example. Yes there are kids – and adults – who manifest these behaviours. Yes they may well be in excess of the usual. Yes they may be self-destructive and problematic, and the rest of it. Yes there might well even be a role for some sort of psychological intervention or help. But psychiatric illness? I remain to be convinced.

However, as to concerns about medicating away difficult individuals, or legal/forensic ramifications – or comparisons with the dark days of Soviet psychiatry – that’s a few bridges too far. ODD really represents a description of a state rather than of an illness. “Here’s a difficult kid” sort of thing. It’s not, in my understanding …

… I was about to write that we wouldn’t tend to medicate it, but found this on PubMed:

CNS Drugs. 2009;23(1):1-17. doi: 10.2165/0023210-200923010-00001.

Psychopharmacological treatment of oppositional defiant disorder.
Turgay A.

Toronto ADHD Clinic, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Turgay@sympatico.ca

Abstract
Oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) consists of an enduring pattern of uncooperative, defiant and hostile behaviour toward authority figures that does not involve major antisocial violations and is not accounted for by the developmental stage of the child. The rate of ODD in children and adolescents in the general population has been reported to be between 2% and 16%. The International Classification of Diseases 10th Revision (ICD-10) classifies ODD as a mild form of conduct disorder (CD), and it has been estimated that up to 60% of patients with ODD will develop CD. Therefore, ODD should be identified and treated as early and effectively as possible.In more than one-half of patients with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), ODD is also part of the clinical picture. There is strong evidence in the literature to suggest that ODD and ADHD overlap; many medications that are used to treat ADHD may also be efficacious in the treatment of ODD. A few studies have reported the positive effects of psychostimulants or atomoxetine in the treatment of ODD associated with ADHD. Patients with ODD and CD with severe aggression may respond well to risperidone, with or without psychostimulants. Mood regulators, alpha(2)-agonists and antidepressants may also have a role as second-line agents in the treatment of ODD and its co-morbidities.

Seriously, if up to 1/6 of the population “have” something, it’s hard for me to see that it’s abnormal. The bahaviours shown in ODD, it’s pretty easy to see, are social and environmental in nature, and therefore require social and environmental changes to address the needs of the society – not throwing diagnoses and stimulants at young kids.

So. As I thought I probably would, I’ve ended up saying this diagnostic category is not a good thing. Not however because it could be used to keep the free-thinkers in line ;) but because it distracts from what is really underlying these kids’ problems, and detracts from any real interventions (social, and huge) that are what will change the situation. It seems to me that kids with “ODD” are really just a reflection of the inequities, injustice, and broken nature of our current societies. Until we address that, some kids will display behaviours sufficient to make this diagnosis (and then conduct disorder, and then antisocial personality disorder). Focussing on the kids themselves – and medicating them – will not help that overall, even if it does improve the behaviour and function of individual children.

Bass Ackwards (danger before diagnosis)

Today I heard something that illustrates perfectly what is wrong with the risk-averse – and defined by risk – approach that mental health services take. A person was brought to us from the local court, having been seen by a psychiatric nurse from the forensic service. After the assessment, when my nurse fed back to the forensic psych nurse, he was told that their starting point in the forensic service when assessing someone is “would I want this person on the street?”

That. Has. Nothing. To. Do. With. Psychiatry.

I was stunned and angered. After all, that really is social control. Overtly so. I am professionally ashamed to be at all associated with such an attitude. The starting point should – must – always and only be “is this person ill?” Answering that question leads on to a bunch of other questions, some of which can indeed relate to dangerousness of one sort or another. But that cannot be the starting point for any sort of health service. For any sort of doctor – or nurse.

Hearing that attitude and approach leaves one totally unsurprised by anti-psychiatry thinking. If that is what one sees of psychiatry, one should indeed be agin it. Unfortunately it really hammers the credibility of those of us who haven’t got things arse backwards, as we all get tarred with the same brush.

In summary: gggrrrrrrrr%|%*!~&)!:@*%#*+]*£]!|^

Compulsory Psychiatric Treatment: the Case For

I’ve written a fair bit lamenting the misuse of psychiatry and mental health services for the wrong ends – shading into social control at times. While that is all true, and I don’t shrink from saying so, I thought maybe I should also present the case for compulsory treatment.

I’ll start by illustrating with reference to a patient I’ve treated in the past who illustrates the situation quite starkly. I was involved with this case in and out of hospital, on both a voluntary and compulsory basis at various times. When unwell this person does unwise and potentially dangerous things – and poses risk not just to themself but also to their child. In response I’ve admitted them to hospital against their will, and been called every name under the sun for about a week – until the mood stabiliser did its thing, whereupon they tended to be insightful, grateful, and a little apologetic.

Contrast that with the approach that would be advocated by Thomas Szasz and those who follow his thinking too closely. They do not believe there is ever a justification for compulsory treatment, and so would leave someone like this unwell, because being so unwell and insightless, offers of treatment are rejected adamantly. Possible or even likely consequences for someone like this include serious harm to them and/or their child, imprisonment, and pretty much certain removal of the child into foster care.

Looking on one hand at my approach, and on the other at that of Szasz et al, I’m very sure that mine is the more humane and moral of the two.

In essence the starting point is that some people with psychiatric illness do not recognise they are ill and/or that they need treatment. “Hold on! That’s damn paternalistic … mutter mutter … god complex … mutter mutter….”

In fact psychiatric illnesses can affect a person’s thinking in profound ways. For example: someone with schizophrenia will often have formal thought disorder, which means the process of their thinking is disorganised, making it very hard to process information logically. The very nature of delusions – which are generally held very fixedly – means that the person will often not see treatment as relevant: why would medication change reality?

It’s not just schizophrenia though. Someone manic might feel too good to want treatment, or too powerful to accept what we offer. Someone depressed might believe they are such an awful person that they deserve to die, and do not warrant help. There are many ways in which psychiatric illness can prevent the afflicted person from seeing their illness and/or need for treatment.

Of course, many people with many other sorts of (non-psychiatric) illnesses, for much more prosaic reasons, fail to seek or accept help – and we can’t make them. Nor would we seek to try, other than by ongoing efforts at educating them about their illness and its treatment. Most of the time that’s the approach we take in psychiatry as well. All this discussion of compulsory treatment should not be taken to mean it’s the way we do things all the time. It’s simply that removing someone’s rights is an act that should properly require a large amount of careful thought.

However, sometimes in psychiatry we do treat people against their will, for the reasons outlined above – though they’re not sufficient in themselves (at least in the countries I know a bit about). Basically we as a society have decided that simply being psychiatrically ill and lacking insight and/or capacity to seek and accept treatment is not enough to warrant compulsory treatment; only when there is risk of serious harm to the patient themselves or to some other person is compulsory treatment legally allowed.

So while longer term compulsory community treatment orders have not been demonstrated to be all that useful, short-term compulsory treatment can definitely reduce the problems resulting from the illness. I certainly prefer to work without it, but unlike Szasz and his lot, I recognise there are occasions when using the MHA is the best thing I can do for a patient. I’m not blinded by ideology and my own past.

A crucial thing about use of the MHA is that it should be done in an open, honest – and respectful – manner. Thus we shouldn’t shrink from thinking about and discussing its use, and we must adhere to the principle of the least restrictive option being the one that is chosen. – And we must be clear with the patient about the process through which we are putting them.

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