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Irreducible Epiphany

“This, is the world that you know.”

My registrars and I have been reading about and discussing phenomenology, in preparation for a presentation (which we did today, but I was most disappointed that the video clips I had embedded – and that worked fine on other computers – didn’t play on the laptop we had for the presentation, so I had to recite Morpheus’ lines from the clips below). We focused on delusions to illustrate many of the aspects of phenomenology – as opposed to (relatively) simple descriptive psychopathology. The standard definition of a delusion is along the lines of “a fixed false belief, not understandable within the patient’s culture/social group, that is not amenable to reason” – or some variation. The essential points being that it is false, it isn’t shared with others, and it’s fixed/can’t be reasoned away.

Karl Jaspers, a psychiatrist and philosopher, wrote about phenomenology, and found that standard definition wanting. Rather than the content of the belief (that is, that it is false, and not shared with others), he wrote that the form was what defines the phenomenon: in particular the characteristic way the belief arises.

Jaspers described a primary delusional process – kind of the archetype of a delusion; not all will be like this, but it’s like an underlying template. First there is often what is termed a “delusional mood” or delusional atmosphere. Anyone who’s seen The Matrix should recognise this: it is a state of heightened sensitivity, where everything around has increased meaning and seems to refer to the self. There is a sense of perplexity, that something is wrong but they do not know what.

Here’s one of the best descriptions of that state I have heard:

Out of that state crystallises the primary delusion, in a fashion quite different from ordinary belief: it is instantly known, fully-formed (sometimes in response to a perception that becomes imbued with delusional significance – and is termed a delusional perception). The delusion “explains” the preceding unpleasant dysphoric perplexed and anxious state, and thereby allows the person to feel again that everything makes sense.

This delusion is then held to with extraordinary conviction. The person is unable to even subject it to logic, as it becomes bound so closely with their sense of self that for the delusion to go would mean complete collapse of how they now see themselves and the world. Rather than misapplying logic, it appears the deluded person parcels off the delusion and logic is simply not applied to it at all.

In contrast to secondary delusions (for example: forming a delusional belief about one’s hallucinatory voices), the primary delusion process is seen as irreducible: we cannot break it down into anything more basic. It is also said to be ultimately un-understandable, as it is so qualitatively different from normal human experience. As I was thinking about this however, I began to relate it to the notion of epiphany. The more I thought about it, the more I thought that phenomenologically it is in fact analogous to the primary delusional process. I’ll illustrate with my own experience of an epiphany.

One evening in my late teens I was walking home from my crappy supermarket job. I recall feeling somewhat odd or different, and that everything was a bit more “real” and meaningful than usual. It was dark, and as I walked I looked up and saw the stars. Suddenly – and instantly – I was struck by a realisation of the vastness of the universe, my own cosmic insignificance, and yet my connectedness to that unfathomably vast universe.

The parallels are, I hope, clear. Another thing about my experience which appears to be shared with the delusional process is that it was not simply the idea that sprang into my mind; it was accompanied by its own quite intense affect. That seems to be the case with delusions: it’s not “just” a belief; there is a feeling (an affective state) associated with that belief.

Both the idea/belief and its associated affect have remained with me, unchanged, for 2 decades now. It has become a very important part of how I see myself and the world – and if I really think about it, it’s not something I do, or want to, apply logic to. The fact that the universe is in actuality unfathomably vast, and I am indeed cosmically insignificant (though made from elements forged in supernovae) is irrelevant. Just because it is true doesn’t mean there’s any logic in it, and it does feel somehow odd if I try to aim logic toward it: to even begin trying to formulate a course of logical enquiry is uncomfortable.

It’s also interesting that this happened for me in my late teens – around when schizophrenia often has its onset in males. I wonder if there’s any pattern to the ages at which prophets have their revelations….

So. The point of that?

Simply that I think the apparently un-understandable primary delusional process might not be as qualitatively different and alien as we generally think, and perhaps there is some scope for empathic understanding of the deluded person’s experience.

I’ll finish with another clip from the Matrix with relevance to psychiatry, philosophy and phenomenology. Why? Because I got it all set for our presentation and it failed, and so I might as well use it here. The connection is that a delusionary belief does not exist in isolation: it occurs within the person’s experience of reality … so what is real?

Armchair Diagnosis, Stigma, and Discrimination

It’s tempting to do: to see some well-known person behaving oddly, or badly, and trying to fit them into some psychiatric diagnosis. There are even published papers – I recall one in the British Journal of Psychiatry years ago discussing jazz musicians.

We seem now to look at rugby players.

Who all seem to have bipolar disorder.

I understand it. It’s a nice intellectual exercise – kind of detective work: not like a real-life police detective actually finding out facts, but sitting Holmes-like and declaiming on what one has seen. There’s also the appeal of possibly helping to de-stigmatise psychiatric illness – or even to “normalise” it (though surely “normalising” a serious illness is a bit of a funny idea…). It’d be nice to be able to point to some well-known and successful people with the illness you’ve just diagnosed a young person with, and perhaps give them some hope (justified or not is a different question).

The thing that occurs to me (in addition to the question of whether or not being a publicly-known figure makes it ok for all and sundry to speculate about your health, psychiatric or otherwise) is that it can be hard enough to be definitive about the diagnosis of the person sitting right in front of you, when you’ve asked the questions you want, and observed the person directly. To read second and third hand accounts of behaviour, and see footage of them in non-interview settings and so on, and try to extract a diagnosis from that, is a seriously fraught endeavour.

I’ve just deleted a paragraph that included a couple of names, because even saying overtly that it’s speculation and using them as examples of why we shouldn’t so speculate, it seems wrong to me. It would imbue the notion that these people have or had psychiatric illnesses with a semblance of authority, when in fact it is nothing more than somewhat idle speculation.

I’m not sure that it is all that good for psychiatry – or psychiatric patients – either. Well-known people are well-known. ;) Or at least we all think they are. We think we know about them. We have our own ideas about them – so when a shrink comes along and is seen to excuse some bad behaviour by saying it’s psychiatric illness, if it doesn’t gel with our conception of them, we see it as just that: an excuse. The reality and impact of psychiatric illness is potentially then downgraded. Perhaps thereby psychiatric illness is somewhat “normalised” … but I don’t think we want to “normalise it”.

It is not normal to be so depressed you stand in a corner not moving, eating or drinking – not eating because you believe your insides have rotted away. It is not normal to sleep only an hour at night (if you really can’t keep your eyes open) because you’re too busy being the new prophet of god and satan working to bring peace to the Middle-East by sending thought messages to Oprah Winfrey. It is not normal to be unable to leave the house for fear of crippling panic attacks that leave you drenched in sweat, with your heart pounding out of your chest, sure you’re about to have a heart attack, drop dead and go crazy. It is not normal to be unable to function because you spend 18 hours a day showering, and washing your hands, or to take 2 hours to get down the road because you have to keep doubling back to check you locked the door – even though you know absolutely that you are clean, or did lock the door, and that your thought and behaviour are irrational. It is not normal to believe that you have an implant in your brain by which the FBI are tracking you, because you said something negative about George Bush in a FaceBook status update.

I don’t see that this sort of thing addresses the stigma – or more properly the discrimination suffered by people with psychiatric illnesses. The stigma is real: some illnesses (thinking particularly psychotic illness) do mark a person as different. The treatments can do that pretty well too: blunted affect, worsened negative symptoms, movement disorders – these are all stigmata of psychiatric illness. Anecdotes about people living well with psychiatric illness don’t change the stigma. The discrimination is related but different. We discriminate against those who are different from us – hence the importance of the stigmata.

But really, I don’t see that saying this or that famous person has this or that psychiatric illness has much of a show of reducing discrimination against people with psychiatric illness in general. What? Are we all going to think when we see someone obviously psychotic “oh, that famous rugby player was diagnosed with bipolar disorder; I won’t discriminate against this person”? Like so much elsegood and important in life, I think it comes down to empathy. We don’t want to normalise psychiatric illness, we want to encourage an empathic response. Some education about what happens in psychiatric illness is needed, and trying to help people to think “how would I be feeling if that were happening to me? How would I hope people would react to me?”

… Instead of “omg lock up the crazy person!” – which I see far too often.

postscript, as though it needs saying: the above descriptions are not of any actual people’s symptoms. They’re more  like archetypes off the top of my head, if you like ;)

Guaranteed Safety?

Here’s something that bugs me (surprise surprise). ;) All too often I hear that someone can or cannot “guarantee their safety” – after they’ve been assessed say following deliberate self-harm, or presenting with depression or suicidal thoughts … or pretty much anything, actually. The notion that anyone can “guarantee their safety” is quite frankly, stark raving bonkers (says the shrink). 

1. If they want to kill themselves, they might not necessarily want to tell you so. They might indeed “guarantee their safety” so that you send them home. Where they suicide.

2. They don’t know – any more than do I – what is going to happen in the immediate future. There’s no way they can know whether or not they will feel overwhelmed enough to do something. 

Asking anyone whether they can “guarantee” that they will “be safe” is completely non-sensical. So why is it done? I think it’s one of those things that just inveigles its way into practice: younger practitioners see older ones asking the question and using the language, and they pick it up. It also seems to be seen as protective for the practitioner – when in fact it’s absolutely not. If you send someone home and they suicide, the coroner is not going to care too much that they “guaranteed their safety”.

Conversely, just because someone says (quite sensibly) that they cannot give such a guarantee, it does not necessarily follow that they need to be admitted, detained, or whatever. Whether or not someone “feels safe” is often – or at least sometimes – not a useful thing to talk about. Some people will never feel “safe”, and talking about how safe they feel is not going to lead anywhere. It is more productive to talk about other aspects of their symptomatology and current circumstances in order to arrive at a sensible plan.

This has called to mind for me a man I saw some years back. He was pretty much never free from thoughts of self-harm and suicide. I can’t remember now what was the specific reason he presented the day I saw him, but while I was talking with him he started many times to say something about how unsafe he was feeling. I decided quickly that it was no use discussing this however, as there was nowhere for it to go other than “I want to kill myself”. While I didn’t dismiss the intensity of his feelings, or the possibility that he might do something, I chose to focus on his distress and circumstances, and what supports could be mustered and offered, rather than ask him to assure me that he wouldn’t do anything to himself.

Really, it wasn’t his job to reassure me …

Instead we arrived at a plan. We agreed on what he could do, and what my team and I could do, to address his current problems. I didn’t try to “fix” his suicidality (not something that was going to happen quickly), but helped him to identify some practical solutions to what he was distressed over, and arranged some extra support.

And no, he didn’t harm or kill himself …

While this is only one case of many where the notion of “guaranteeing safety” or “feeling safe” come up, it has really remained with me – I think because he kept trying to talk about feeling unsafe (which is no doubt what most clinicians had tended to ask him about) and I had to do a bit of work to steer him towards a more practically-focused, and useful, discussion.

“Safe” is such a useless word in psychiatry. It’s thrown around all over the place, but truly means little – while being taken to mean a great deal. That is a recipe for disaster and/or poor care.

Do Psychiatric Drugs Cause Disability?

Here’s an interesting debate, linked to on Twitter by Steve Silberman (who you should follow, if you don’t already):

Robert Whitaker, who thinks psych drugs are creating an epidemic of mental illness, vs. a roomful of psychiatrists Linky

I thought this a good article, that showed both the disagreement and the discussion. Whitaker seems to raise reasonable points, but there might be some real problems with his interpretation of the data as well.

What’s important is that it doesn’t get ignored – or trumpeted as “proof that psych drugs are terrible”. I’m thinking here of Thomas Szasz, who raises sone really important issues, but goes too far. He then gets ignored by most psychiatrists, and glorified by the anti-psychiatry movement. Neither position is helpful, because there needs to be careful consideration and exploration of the issues he raises.

Similarly here, an important issue is being raised. It must neither be swallowed whole (at this stage) nor dismissed out of hand. It must be explored further, in a rational and scientific manner.

Diagnose to Prescribe

Anecdotal discussion alert … aOOOOga! aOOOOga!

I’ve decided this morning that diagnostic restrictions on prescribing of medications are not helpful. What am I talking about? The more expensive a medication is, the less the funding agencies want you to prescribe it; they would rather we use dirt-cheap haloperidol than expensive quetiapine for example. These expensive medications are therefore regulated, generally by way of subsidising them only for particular conditions (not necessarily all for which the medication is indicated – quetiapine as an example again: it was indicated in bipolar disorder in Australia for much longer than it has been subsidised for that indication).

You might think that’s a reasonable approach, but I’m not sure it has the intended effect. It seems to me, working in an acute community team which receives referrals from all and sundry, that more and more people appear to have these diagnoses – particularly bipolar disorder, once quetiapine became subsidised for the treatment of that condition….

Bipolar disorder’s the flavour of the month anyway (and has been for quite some months), and I’m not shy of making the diagnosis myself, but I have a sense it’s being used in order to “justify” prescription of quetiapine (or sometimes olanzapine) to people with other problems – not even necessarily based in psychiatric illness. Someone talks about “mood swings” (which seems very often to mean “I get angry easily”) and you can almost bet nowadays that someone is going to think about “the bipolar”. It’s then not a terribly big step to give quetiapine (flavour of the month again) which will in fact help in a case like that: it’s calming, sedating, it’ll help them sleep.

But taking an antipsychotic drug in order to keep calmer, and to sleep a bit better? Arguably even if these medications were completely innocuous (which they’re not) and inexpensive (which they’re not) there would still be something wrong with that: it’s (again) pathologising normality/real life, externalising control, abdicating responsibility and so on. And of course these medications are neither innocuous nor inexpensive.

So why do I think the diagnostic regulations are bad? Don’t I want them restricted to only the people who should have them? Yes, but … I wonder if it’s really working, or whether it’s actually just resulting in pressure to give diagnostic labels to people without real justification, in order to give them basically a non-addictive tranquilliser.

Like everyone used to use thioridazine (Melleril).

… Until we found out it does nasty things to the conduction in your heart and might kill you dead without warning …

Again, it comes back to our profession’s inability to differentiate sufficiently between illness and reaction to life. If we could do so, this would be much less of an issue.

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